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This paper investigates multi-item moral hazard with auditing contests. Although the
presented model is widely applicable, we choose tax evasion as an exemplary application.
We introduce a tax-evasion model where tax authority and taxpayer invest in detection and
concealment. The taxpayers have multiple potential income sources and are heterogeneous
with respect to their evasion scruples. The tax authority - unable to commit to an audit
strategy - observes a tax declaration and chooses its auditing e⁄orts. We show that a tax
inspector prefers to audit source by source until he ￿nds evidence for evasion to conduct a
full-scale audit thereafter.
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11 Introduction
In the real world there are many examples for situations where principals ask agents to make
statements which have consequences for later payo⁄s. A tax inspector may ask: How much rent
did you get for a this certain property? A judge may ask a defendant in a murder trial where
he had been during the night in question. An environmental inspector asks the ￿rm owner if a
certain production process complies with emission laws. Even in situations where no authority
is involved such situations may occur. A potential buyer asks the antique seller if the chair is an
original Louis XV. Quite often - like in the examples above - the payo⁄ consequences are such
that there are incentives to make an untruthful statement. In contract theory optimal direct
revelation mechanisms are developed that prevent agents from cheating. Baron and Myerson
(1982) is an example for the regulation of a monopolist, Chander and Wilde (1998) deal with the
case of tax evasion. In the real world, however, the rules are not always incentive compatible.
Agents do actually cheat. Therefore we observe institutions that try to verify whether statements
are true. Fines have to be paid if a statement is found untruthful. In the literature agents only
have the choice of being truthful or not. In reality they have another choice: They can invest
resources in covering their untruthful statements. The property owner may accept a lower rent
for payment in cash. The defendant may bribe someone to give him an alibi. The ￿rm owner
may pay someone to dump toxic waste. The antique dealer may use chemicals to arti￿cially age
the wood of the chair. This observation suggests that the outcome of an audit does not only
depend on the auditing e⁄ort, but also on the concealment e⁄ort exerted by the agent. In these
situations audit becomes a contest.
Often a principal asks an agent to make many payo⁄-relevant statements at once. The
taxman asks for statements about more than one income source; the judge asks the defendant
more than one question, the potential buyer wants to purchase more than just the single chair.
This paper investigates how an auditor should proceed in a situation in of multiple-item moral
hazard with auditing contests. For convenience we choose tax evasion as our application; but
the model structure can be easily applied to any other situation described above.
2 Related literature
In the literature on tax evasion - and on moral hazard with audit in general - the detection
technology is usually characterized by an audit probability. If an audit takes place a potential
fraud is revealed with certainty.1 This assumption is still widely used and was introduced by
the early neoclassical tax evasion literature ( Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974).2 In
later contract theoretical contributions, where the tax authority has been introduced as a player,
the tax inspector￿ s strategy is the assignment of an audit probability to a received tax declaration
(see e.g. Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Border and Sobel (1987), Mookherjee and Png (1989),
Mookherjee and Png (1990), or Chander and Wilde (1998)). The audit costs increase with the
audit probability. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the audit process in a richer
situation. We model the detection probability as the outcome of a contest, where the taxpayer
invests in concealment, while the authority spends resources on detection. So the probability
for the veri￿cation of earned income does not only depend on the authority￿ s detection e⁄ort,
but also on the e⁄ort the tax evader puts into concealment.3
As a second fundamental di⁄erence to the contract-theoretical tax-evasion literature we do
1Exceptions are the imperfect auditing settings of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) and Boadway and
Sato (2000).
2For a comprehensive survey of the neoclassical tax evasion literature see Cowell (1990a).
3The idea that the taxpayer can invest into concealment is explored in an optimal taxation framework by
Cremer and Gahvari (1995). Yaniv (1999) interprets concealment investment as costly money laundering. The
case of legal tax sheltering is examined by Cowell (1990b).
2not allow the tax authority to commit beforehand to an audit strategy.4 The reason that we
prefer the non-commitment assumption is twofold. Firstly, we belief that in reality the tax
authority does not really commit itself. An indication for this is the veil of secrecy surrounding
the authority￿ s audit strategies. Credible commitment, however, requires that the taxpayers
know the audit strategies the authority will use. Furthermore, the taxpayers do not seem to
believe commitment attempts. In a ￿eld experiment (Slemrod et al., 2001) taxpayers did not
signi￿cantly change their reporting behaviour after receiving a letter telling them to be audited
with certainty. Secondly, the optimal audit, ￿ne and tax schemes, and the resulting reporting
behaviour arising from the commitment models are not very realistic. Generally, optimal ￿nes
are very high (usually even maximal), taxes are regressive, and the revelation principle holds,
which implies that there is no tax evasion in equilibrium.
The third distinct feature of our model is the introduction of heterogeneous taxpayers with
multiple income sources. The taxpayers are assumed to di⁄er in their behaviourally relevant
attitudes towards tax evasion. These attitudes are captured by di⁄erent moral costs of evasion.5
The introduction of multiple income sources seems a natural improvement to the models, where
income is homogeneous. So the declaration pattern over di⁄erent income sources reveals some
information to the authority about the likelihood of facing an evader. The tax inspector can
get even more valuable information if he adopts a sequential auditing strategy. He can use the
information gained from previous audits when deciding over detection e⁄orts for sources that
are not audited yet.
3 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the setup of our model is described;
some simplifying assumptions are introduced and discussed. In section 5 we derive the optimal
concealment and audit e⁄orts that will be used during the remainder of the paper. The op-
timal audit e⁄ort for a particular source is shown to depend on the believed probability that
the income from this source is evaded. The taxpayer￿ s decision over evasion and concealment
e⁄ort depends on some source speci￿c parameters. Section 6 deals with ￿ghosts￿- crooks who
entirely go underground. These people do not report any income regardless how much they may
have earned.6 We show that the sequential auditing strategy deals with ghosts more e⁄ectively.
Compared to the simultaneous auditing a sequential auditing strategy imposes stronger restric-
tions on the environment in order to allow for ghost behaviour. We also show that sequential
auditing leads to a higher expected payo⁄ for the authority. Consequently, it is optimal for the
authority to audit source by source at ￿rst to ￿nally conduct a full-scale simultaneous audit
whenever suspicion arises during the sequential audits.
Section 7 explores the case where the environment is not favourable enough for crooks to
behave as ghosts. We characterize the arising hybrid equilibrium and compare the impact of
di⁄erent audit strategies. This is the situation most tax evaders will be in. We show for two
sources that the intuition from the analysis of ghosts carries over. Section 8 shows that our model
with sequential auditing can explain a phenomenon not well understood so far - moonlighting
craftsmen. We show that it might be optimal for a crook to engage in both the black market
economy and also in the o¢ cial sector, even if going totally underground leads to higher payo⁄s
than working only in the o¢ cial sector does. Basically, the intuition behind this result is that
sequential auditing may lead to an ex ante expected return from evasion that decreases with
additional income sources allocated to the informal sector. The expected vengeance of an audit
4The non-commitment assumption was inroduced by Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Graetz et al. (1986)
into the tax evasion literature. Khalil (1997) clari￿es the e⁄ects of non-commitment in a monopoly-regulation
framework.
5For models with similar considerations see Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Gordon (1989), or Bordignon (1993).
6A more precise de￿nition of ghost behaviour will be given later on.
3if the authority gets suspicious during sequential checks is the reason for that. We conclude with
a summary of our main results.
4 The model
In this section we develop our setup, introduce some notation and explain our simplifying as-
sumptions. We begin with the timing.
4.1 Timing and some notation
There are N possible income sources. Income source i yields income Yi if it is productive. Nature
determines whether source i is productive or not. The probability that it is is denoted by ￿i.
After observing the actual income generated by the possible sources the taxpayer has to ￿le a
tax return. He separately declares his income for the sources. The income declared for source i
is denoted by di. The taxpayer has the possibility to invest some resources in order to reduce
the veri￿cation probabilities pi. His investment is measured by the sheltering e⁄ort ei.
After having received the declaration di for every source the authority decides how many
resources to invest in order to increase the probability that the true income is veri￿ed. The
detection e⁄ort for source i is denoted by ai. The tax inspector can exert di⁄erent e⁄ort levels
for di⁄erent sources. Furthermore, he can audit sequentially if he prefers to do so. That means
that the authority can decide which source(s) to examine ￿rst. Nature decides if the true income
from the audited source(s) is veri￿ed. The probability of veri￿cation pi depends on the e⁄orts.
Then, after observing the outcome of this audit(s) it can condition its e⁄ort for the next source(s)
to be audited on this observation. At the time of the decision the authority has no knowledge
about the concealment e⁄orts exerted by the taxpayer.
4.2 Crooks and good citizens
We assume that there are some moral costs that are incurred by the taxpayer whenever he does
not truthfully report an income source. Spicer and Becker (1980), Bayer and Reichl (1997),
and Anderhub et al. (2001) show in experimental studies that di⁄erent taxpayers may behave
di⁄erently even if they face the same situation. Some people are always honest, some others do
evade taxes. Social Psychology suggests that moral constraints are the source for heterogeneity.
The attitude towards a certain criminal act is determined by its expected gain, internalized moral
norms and peer group attitudes.7 The attitude towards a crime determines the drive to commit
the crime. Moral cost can be interpretd as the expected disutility arising from not conforming
to internalised norms or to exhibit behaviour that con￿ icts with peer group attitudes. This
justi￿es the inclusion of moral costs in the utility function of a taxpayer.8
For simplicity we assume that there are only two types of taxpayers. Crooks with low moral
costs and law abiding citizens with moral costs that are high enough to force them to be honest.
As in seminal reputation models (e.g. Kreps et al., 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a; Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982b) we exogenously ￿x the behaviour for one type. The individuals with
considerable scruples are always honest, since their evasion costs are assumed to be prohibitive.
In this respect the sequential auditing setup is similar to a reputation model. But there is an
important di⁄erence. The taxpayer has to decide over all his declarations before the authority
starts to audit. So in the strict sense there is no room for reputation building although the
structure of the belief formation is very similar.
7The most in￿ uential theoretical framework is the ￿Theory of Planned Behaviour￿established in Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980) and extended in Ajzen (1991).
8This is admittedly a very crude black box simpli￿cation of a very complex psychological construct, but it will
be su¢ cient to serve the purpose of this paper.
4The moral cost are denoted by ￿ 2 f￿l;￿hg. Without loss of generality we normalize ￿l to 0.
Realistically, we assume that the tax authority does not know the type of the taxpayer. Let ￿
be the prior probability of facing a crook. We can interpret ￿ as the fraction of crooks in the
population. We assume ￿ to be common knowledge.
4.3 Pay-o⁄s
In order to be able to specify the pay-o⁄s we have to make assumptions about the objectives and
risk preferences of the tax authority and the taxpayer. We assume both the authority and the
taxpayer to be risk neutral. It is quite common to assume risk neutrality for the principal, which
is the authority in our case. The assumption concerning the risk preferences of the taxpayer is
not crucial for the remainder of the paper. Risk aversion would just increase the in￿ uence of
the ￿ne that is imposed in the case of the taxpayer is convicted for tax evasion.
The taxpayer maximizes income net of tax liability, resources invested in concealment, moral
cost of evasion, and expected ￿nes. The expected interim payo⁄ after the gross incomes are
realized and after both parties have made their decisions, but before nature decides which





i ￿ T(di) ￿ F(Y a
i ;di) ￿ p(ei;ai) ￿ C(ei) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1)
Here Y a
i is the actual income from source i, T(di) represents the tax liability for an income
declaration di, while F(Y a
i ;di) denotes the ￿ne a taxpayer has to pay if his true income is
veri￿ed after having declared an income of di. The ￿ne includes the repayment of evaded taxes.
By assuming the tax liabilities and potential ￿nes to be additive over di⁄erent income sources,
we implicitly assume that the tax and penalty schemes are linear. The probability that the
true income from an income source can be veri￿ed is denoted by p(ei;ai). It depends on the
detection and concealment e⁄orts (ai and ei) that are exerted by the authority and the taxpayer.
Obviously, p(ei;ai) should increase with ai and decrease with ei: The concealment costs, which
depend on the e⁄ort level, are given by C(ei): The moral cost incurred by the evasion of a certain
income component is given by ￿, while ￿ is an indicator variable for evasion.
Similarly the expected interim pay-o⁄ for the authority (before nature decides which income




T(di) + F(Y a
i ;di) ￿ p(ei;ai) ￿ K(ai) (2)
We assume the authority to maximize enforced tax payments plus expected ￿nes net of detec-
tion costs K(ei). The alternative assumption of a more sel￿sh authority, which just wants to
maximize expected ￿nes net of detection costs, does not make a substantial di⁄erence for the
model￿ s implications.9
4.4 Simplifying assumptions
In order to keep the model tractable we have to make some simplifying assumptions about
functional forms.
A1 The costs of in￿ uencing the veri￿cation probability in the favoured direction are increasing
and convex for both players.
9It does not matter for the results how much the tax authority - if at all - values paid taxes. This is true
because the taxes are sunk at the moment the authority chooses its e⁄orts. In models where the authority can
credibly commit to announced audit schemes this distinction certainly matters.
5The rationale for this assumption is the following. If one of the actors wants to shift the
veri￿cation probability in his favoured direction he has to put in some costly e⁄ort. The bigger
the shift intended the bigger is the e⁄ort required, and consequently the higher the costs are.
In addition the actors should use the cheapest means of detection or covering ￿rst. That means
it gets more expensive to achieve a further shift in probability if your e⁄ort increases. So the
costs are convex.
A2 The marginal costs of in￿ uencing the probability do not depend on the e⁄ort the other
player exerts.
This assumption takes away the strategic e⁄ect that the actors can in￿ uence with their
e⁄orts how hard it is for the opponent to shift the veri￿cation probability. We believe that
this e⁄ect is relevant in reality. However, for our purpose - to investigate sequential auditing -
we have to keep the contest simple to assure that the model remains tractable. The resulting
additive structure of the detection probability seems to be a bit troublesome. However, the
interpretation that an exogenous detection exists, which can be in￿ uenced to a certain degree
by the two parties intuitively makes sense. If the tax authority does not exert any e⁄ort the
taxpayer can reduce the detection probability to zero with a high e⁄ort. On the other hand, if
the taxpayer does not exert any e⁄ort the authority can make sure with a high e⁄ort that the
audit is successful. If the opposition in the contest exerts any e⁄ort though, it is not possible
to reach certainty (of detection or getting away with evasion), even with a very high e⁄ort. We
think that this restriction on the probability function is realistic.
Although these two assumptions are su¢ cient for the results, for simplicity we will impose
speci￿c restrictions on functional forms for probability and cost functions. The properties of the
veri￿cation-probability function are the following. Subscripts denote partial derivatives:
p(ei;ai) 2 [0;1] (3)
pe < 0; pee > 0;
pa > 0; paa < 0
pae = 0:
A veri￿cation probability that is increasing and concave in a; but decreasing and convex in e
together with linear cost satis￿es the assumptions A1 and A2. So we de￿ne the e⁄ort cost for






We introduce the parameter ￿ to describe the concealment opportunity for the taxpayer.
The higher ￿ is, the cheaper it is for the taxpayer to hide a potential evasion.
A3 The marginal change in the detection probability approaches 0 for e⁄orts a or e tending to
in￿nity (i.e. pe ! 0 if e ! 1 and pa ! 0 if a ! 1), where the marginal probability
changes for the ￿rst units of e⁄orts are given by pe(0;a) = ￿! and pa(e;0) = ￿.
The ￿rst part is one of the commonly used Inada conditions to ensure the existence of
an interior solution to the maximization problem at the upper end. Note that we have not
imposed any conditions that prevent the optimal e⁄orts to be zero. A zero e⁄ort of the authority
can be seen as rubber-stamping a declaration. In reality such a behaviour is observed quite
often. Furthermore, our notion of detection probability does not rule out a positive detection
probability even with no e⁄ort exerted by the tax inspector. This re￿ ects the fact that the
detection of tax evaders may happen by chance or at least without too much active participation
6of the tax authority.10 The parameter ￿ - the gain of veri￿cation probability by the ￿rst most
e⁄ective unit of e⁄ort - may be seen as a measure for the observability of an economic action. The
corresponding parameter for the taxpayer is !, which is the reduction in veri￿cation probability
caused by the most e⁄ective concealment action of the taxpayer.
For many income sources the parameters ! and ￿ may be correlated. Income sources, where
detection e⁄ort is (not) e⁄ective, gives rise to (not only) few opportunities to conceal. Income
from dependent employment is an example for an income source where detection is e⁄ective
while concealment is not.11 However, there are counter examples. A craftsman engaged in the
black economy may have few e⁄ective opportunities to conceal his activity, because the detection
probability hinges crucially on the discretion of the trading partner while the authority has no
cheap e⁄ective means of investigation.
A4 The taxpayer has no means of exerting any e⁄ort if there is no tax evasion to shelter. After
an audit the authority learns whether the taxpayer put forward any sheltering e⁄ort or
not. The probability that pure chance leads to the veri￿cation of the income is positive
but smaller than one, i.e. 1 > p(0;0) > 0.
This assumption makes sure that the tax inspector learns from an audit that a source yielded
no income whenever this is the case. We argue that this is a reasonable assumption. Think of a
￿ at owned by the taxpayer. It might be reasonable that it is possible for the taxpayer to shelter
his income from letting it. But if he lives there himself, a tax inspector surely should learn from
an audit that no income was created. In other words, we reduce the uncertainty a tax inspector
may face while interpreting the results from auditing a source that was not earned. This will
keep the updating process between audits tractable. The last part of the assumption makes sure
that there is a certain uncertainty about income veri￿cation if both players do not invest into
detection and coverage, respectively.





Yi with probability ￿i
0 with probability 1 ￿ ￿i
As we will see, the audit e⁄ort decision for the tax inspector hinges crucially on the beliefs
on the expected potential ￿ne for a given declaration. If we allow for a continuous income
distribution these beliefs become very complex. However, the additional complexity would not
add any strategic elements to our setting. To allow for a continuous income distribution would
also require an additional assumption about how the ￿ne depends on the income.
A6 The declaration for a particular income source is a dichotomous choice (i.e. di 2 fY a
i ;0g).
We allow the taxpayer only to declare his whole income from an income source or to declare
nothing at all. We are aware that there are some income sources where this assumption is not
appropriate (e.g. tips). But risk neutrality and the linear system we assumed always produces
corner solutions for the declaration decision. By assuming a minor result of the model right
away we do not have to deal separately with this issue for every case we consider.
5 Optimal e⁄orts
Before we consider di⁄erent audit and evasion strategies we determine the optimal detection and
concealment e⁄orts. We begin with the tax inspector. Whenever the tax authority decides to
10Being denounced by an envious neighbour is a quite common fate evaders may have to face.
11Income from selling drugs is an example where detection is hard and concealment is easy.
7audit a certain income component, for which it observed a declaration of zero, it faces the same
auditing problem. It wants to maximize the expected ￿ne by putting in some auditing e⁄ort.
The e⁄ort which solves the maximization problem is the following (we omit the subscripts for
the source here):
a￿ = argmax
a [￿(Y a = Y j d = 0;H) ￿ p(e;a) ￿ F ￿ a]; (5)
where ￿(Y a j d = 0;H) is the tax authority￿ s belief - given a declaration of d = 0 and his infor-
mation H - about the probability that the income was earned. The tax inspectors information
H can be the prior information or some information that was gathered during previous audits.





We also have to consider the case of a possible corner solution. In the case ￿ < 1=￿F the optimal
e⁄ort has to be 0. This is the case whenever the economic activity is too hard to observe and
putting in e⁄ort never pays.
It follows from paa < 0 that the optimal e⁄ort a￿ weakly increases with the ￿ne F and
the belief ￿. Note that the optimal e⁄ort is independent of the e⁄ort the taxpayer might have
exerted. If the authority believes with certainty that the income component was not earned
after observing a declaration of zero (i.e. ￿ = 0) the optimal detection e⁄ort is zero.
We turn to the taxpayer now. Suppose for instance that a taxpayer has earned the income
component and decides not to declare this income. Then he faces the following maximization














We once again have to consider a possible corner solution. For ! > ￿1=￿F the optimal e⁄ort
is zero. This is the case whenever the concealment opportunity is very small and there are no
e⁄ective and cheap means of coverage available. From the ￿rst-order condition and from pee > 0
follows that the optimal concealment e⁄ort e￿ weakly increases with the ￿ne F and with the
concealment opportunity ￿. We summarize these ￿ndings in the following lemmas.12
Lemma 1 If the tax inspector observes a declaration of 0 for an income component and chooses
to audit, his optimal detection e⁄ort a￿ has the following properties: a￿ ￿ 0, da￿=de = 0,
da￿=d￿ ￿ 0; da￿=dF ￿ 0, a￿(￿ j ￿ = 0) = 0.
Lemma 2 If the taxpayer earned an income from a source and decided to hide this income, his
optimal concealment e⁄ort e￿ has the following properties: e￿ ￿ 0; de￿=da = 0, de￿=d￿ ￿ 0;
de￿=dF ￿ 0.
The weak inequalities come from the fact that we did not rule out the corner solutions
a￿ = 0 and e￿ = 0. If zero e⁄orts are optimal a marginally increased incentive for concealment
or detection does not necessarily lead to a positive e⁄ort becoming pro￿table.
12Note, that the second-order conditons are obviously ful￿lled.
86 Auditing with ghosts
In the literature (e.g. Cowell and Gordon, 1995) taxpayers that fail to ￿ll in a tax form are
referred to as ghosts. In reality one may distinguish between non-￿lers and taxpayers that
make a zero declaration. In our model, however, there is no strategic di⁄erence between the two
di⁄erent types of behaviour if we assume that the tax authority has at least the knowledge about
the existence of the taxpayers. We assume this to be the case. We are aware that this assumption
is problematic for countries (like the United Kingdom) where no system of registration exists.
For countries with systems of registration (like e.g. Germany) the assumption seems reasonable.
In this section we look at the conditions to be ful￿lled that behaving as a ghost with certainty
occurs as an equilibrium strategy. We examine, what the authority might want to do against
that and whether the possibility of sequential auditing - compared to simultaneous auditing -
does help to deter taxpayers to behave as ghosts.
6.1 Ghosts with simultaneous auditing
Suppose there are N identical income sources with a hiding opportunity ￿, which yield income
Y with probability ￿ each. Then the strategy a ghost will follow is characterized by
d￿




e￿ if Y a
i = Y
0 if Y a
i = 0
; (10)
where e￿ solves the ￿rst-order condition (equation 8) if possible or is equal to 0 otherwise. Note
that a ghost necessarily has to be a crook (￿ = 0), because we assumed that the moral evasion
cost for the good citizens to be prohibitive. So an honest taxpayer with ￿ = ￿h in the same
situation always reports truthfully (di = Y a
i ) and consequently exerts no concealment e⁄ort:
d￿
i(￿h) = Y a
i 8i (11)
e￿
i(￿h) = 0 8i (12)
Consider the strategy of a tax inspector who simultaneously decides his detection e⁄orts for
all income sources. For this decision the tax inspector￿ s beliefs are crucial. The tax authority has
to assign a probability to every income source that tax evasion has taken place. The available
information under simultaneous auditing is the prior probability that an income source is earned
￿, the prior probability of facing a crook ￿; and the tax return (i.e. the vector of income
declarations d). Let us denote an observed declaration vector that contains only zeros as d0 and
a declaration vector that does contain at least one element that is Y as dY . Together d0 and dY
contain all possible declaration patterns. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the beliefs have to
be consistent with the strategy of the opponent. Obviously, in equilibrium the believed evasion
probability for every income source has to be 0 if the tax inspector observes a declaration dY ,
which is a tax form where at least one income of Y is declared. The reasoning goes like this: If
we want to support a ghost equilibrium with consistent beliefs a tax inspector observing a single
declared income component should update that this never can be the declaration of a crook,
since a crook would behave as a ghost and would always submit a form d0 that contains only
zeros. Consequently, the taxpayer he faces has to be of the honest type. The believed probability
for the income sources to be evaded has to be zero for every potential income component. This
equilibrium belief is denoted by
￿￿
i(dY ) = 0 8i:
What should the tax inspector think of a tax form that contains only zero declarations for all
income sources? We ￿rst derive the updated probability that a d0 declaration comes from a
crook. This probability should be the prior probability of facing a crook (i.e. ￿) normalized by
9the probability that d0 is observed. The probability that an all-zero declaration comes from a
poor honest taxpayer that didn￿ t earn a single income source is given by (1￿￿)(1￿￿)N. Then
the probability of facing a crook (denoted by ￿￿(d0)) after observing d0 is
￿￿(d0) =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)N + ￿
:
Consequently, the probability of facing an always evading crook, that earned income source i
and evaded it, has to be
￿￿
i(d0) = ￿ ￿ ￿￿(d0) 8i
Given these beliefs the tax authority will exert an e⁄ort for every income source that follows
equation 6 where ￿ is given by ￿￿
i(d0). The e⁄orts will be a￿
d = 0 for an observation of dY
and a￿
0 ￿ 0 if d0 is observed. A higher share of crooks in the population ￿, and a higher prior
probability that the source is productive ￿ weakly increase a￿. The intuitive reason for this is
that the prior probabilities for crooks and productive income sources increase the tax inspectors
belief ￿￿ that the income source is earned and evaded given that he received a declaration of
zero. This generates a higher incentive to audit (through the ￿rst-order condition). The e⁄ort
in the possible equilibrium exerted by the tax inspector for all sources is described by:
a￿ =
￿
0 if d = dY
a￿
0(￿(d0)) if d = d0
: (13)
To ￿nd the parameter con￿gurations that allow for a ghost equilibrium with simultaneous
auditing we have to check if behaving as a ghost pays for the taxpayer (given the reaction of
the tax authority). Let n denote the number of income sources (out of N possible) that were
productive for the taxpayer. Then his payo⁄ from going entirely underground if he is a crook
can be written as:
U(d0;n) = n[Y ￿ p(e￿;a￿
0)F ￿ e￿=￿]: (14)
Proposition 1 A ghost equilibrium (characterized by equations 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13) occurs
only if ghost behaviour is optimal for the taxpayer when all income sources are earned. The




0) ￿ p(e￿;0)] + p(e￿;0): (15)
Proof. Note that the strategy of the tax authority a￿ is always optimal for a given ghost
behaviour and consistent beliefs. We have to check under what circumstances the taxpayer has
no incentives to deviate from declaring only zeros given the auditing strategy of the taxpayer.
Let us ￿rst determine the best deviation for the taxpayer. Declaring one of the n earned
income sources and choosing optimal e⁄orts pays U1 = (n ￿ 1)(Y ￿ p(e￿;0)F ￿ e￿=￿) + Y ￿ T:
Declaring j +1 income source yields U1+j = (n￿1￿j)(Y ￿p(e￿;0)F ￿e￿=￿)+(1+j)(Y ￿T)
with j 2 f1;￿￿￿ ;n ￿ 1g: Then we ￿nd that
U1 R U1+j8j 2 f1;￿￿￿ ;n ￿ 1g if p(e￿;0) Q (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F: (16)
Since U1+j increases with j if p(e￿;0) > (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F; we ￿nd that depending on p(e￿;0)
the possible best deviation is either reporting truthfully for all sources or just declaring one
income source. Comparing the equilibrium payo⁄ from behaving as a ghost for n earned in-
come sources (from 14) with the deviation payo⁄ U1 yields U(d0;n) ￿ U1 if (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F ￿
n[p(e￿;a￿
0) ￿ p(e￿;0)]+p(e￿;0): In equilibrium this has to hold for all n. Since rhs of the previous
inequality increases with n; while the left hand side is not in￿ uenced by n; the strongest condition
on the parameters is given by n = N. The case where the best deviation is truthful behaviour is
included in equation 15, because setting n = 0 reduces the condition to p(e￿;0) > (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F,
10which is just the condition for honesty being the best deviation from a possible ghost equilibrium.
Replacing n by N in the inequality above gives the claimed condition.
The condition for ghosts to exist is quite intuitive. On the left hand side of condition (15) we
have the possible net gain per income source divided by the ￿ne. Consequently, higher taxes T,
higher concealment opportunities ￿ and lower ￿nes F promote ghost behaviour. On the other
hand, the more e⁄ective the optimal audit e⁄ort a￿ is compared to rubber-stamping (a = 0), the
higher the gains from evading have to be for the taxpayer to be willing to act as a ghost. More
potential income sources also have a deterrent e⁄ect. The intuition here is that more sources
make it sweeter for a crook to declare just one of them truthfully in order to pretend to be one
of the good citizens and to get away with the concealment of the other income components.
Loosely speaking, we will mainly ￿nd ghosts where not too many income opportunities exist,
where the taxes are high while concealment is cheap, and where it doesn￿ t make a big di⁄erence
for the detection risk whether the authority investigates or not. Crooks may behave as ghosts if
they have the opportunity to earn money with one o⁄ transactions that hardly leave any trails
or checking possibilities. This result seems rather intuitive.13 Our stylized model with multiple
income sources gives a reasonable prediction on the in￿ uence that taxes, earning opportunities,
￿nes, and source related audit e¢ ciency may have on ghost behaviour.
6.2 Ghosts with sequential auditing
We now turn to the situation where the tax authority audits sequentially. The di⁄erence from
the case with simultaneous auditing is that the tax inspector can use information gained from
previous auditing to adjust his auditing e⁄ort. The main purpose of this section is to ￿nd out
whether the additional information gained by sequential auditing is useful to prevent taxpayers
from behaving as ghosts. To answer this question we derive a condition for a ghost equilibrium
to appear when sequential auditing is possible. In order to compare the e⁄ectiveness of the two
di⁄erent audit regimes we check under which regime the environment has to be more favourable
for the taxpayers to behave as ghosts.
The most important change to the simultaneous auditing case is that the inspector adjusts
his beliefs (about facing a crook) after every single audit result he receives. Note that we have
to ￿nd the beliefs that belong to a ghost equilibrium, i.e. the taxpayer will always submit an
all zero tax declaration if he is a crook. The believed probability of facing a crook before the
￿rst audit given a tax form that contains only zeros is the same as in the simultaneous case.
Let us denote this belief as ￿0. Now consider the belief ￿1, which is the belief of facing a crook
after observing the audit result for ￿rst income source. Three things can happen during the ￿rst
audit: The authority may be able to ￿nd concealed income, may not be able to verify a certain
income, or may de￿nitely ￿nd no income. If the authority ￿nds some evaded tax it knows with
certainty that it faces a crook, ￿1 has to be one. What can the tax inspector infer from not
having succeeded in verifying the true income? Knowing that he would have been able to verify
the income if it had been zero, he should infer that he faces an evader. In this case ￿1 should
also be one.14 In the case that the audit veri￿es that no income is earned from the source in
question the tax inspector cannot conclude with certainty whether he faces a crook or an honest
citizen. He has to rely on the prior probability of facing a crook nomalised by the probability
that for the remaining sources no income is declared. So the belief of facing a crook weakens,
because the probability that the all-zero declaration comes from a poor citizen increases after
an audit where no income was found.
13Erard and Ho (2001) show econometrically that indeed the main characteristics of ghosts are earnings that
are hardly observable.
14This ￿ perfect￿updating comes from assumption A4 and can be seen as the most favourable environment for
sequential auditing. Nevertheless, even in a less favourable environment our main result that sequential auditing
imposes a stricter condition on parameters to observe ghosts still goes through. But the analysis gets very
complicated with ￿imperfect￿updating.
11Denote the belief of facing a crook before auditing income source i + 1 - having audited
sources 1 to i already - by ￿i(H); where H is the information gained by previous audits. Let
H be one if there was an audit where a zero income could not be veri￿ed - i.e. proven tax
evasion or the suspicion of an non-veri￿able income - and zero otherwise. We can summarize
the appropriate beliefs given an all-zero declaration and the history of audits:
￿i(H;d0) =
(
1 if H = 1
￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)N￿i+￿ if H = 0 :
So the belief relevant for the audit e⁄ort decision for source i + 1 is given by
￿i(H;d0) = ￿ ￿ ￿i(H;d0): (17)
The optimal sequential audit e⁄orts for an all-zero declaration and a given audit history is
de￿ned by equation 5, where the beliefs ￿i follow equation 17.
We have to be quite careful, when de￿ning the beliefs and the resulting strategy the authority
will adopt whenever it observes at least one declared income source. Naturally in the beginning
the tax inspector - given the possible ghost equilibrium strategy of the taxpayer - should believe
it is facing a honest taxpayer whenever he observes dY . Then the authority has two possible
ways to go ahead. It may rubber-stamp the form and close the case or it may keep the case open
and update the beliefs according to whether chance leads to any surprising veri￿cation results.
The ￿rst strategy is the same as simultaneously auditing with e⁄ort zero, the latter corresponds
to sequential auditing with e⁄ort zero at the beginning. Given the possible equilibrium beliefs
ex ante both strategies yield the same expected revenue for the tax authority, which is just
the amount of taxes paid for the declared sources. It seems obvious that a tax inspector who
does not expect any gains from waiting might prefer to close the case immediately. We do not
explicitly model the waiting cost that might occur, but assume instead that the tax authority
always audits simultaneously if the expected returns are equal.15 It follows that
￿i(dY ) = 0 8i
a￿
i(dY ) = 0 8i: (18)
So far, we did not discuss the determinants for the optimal sequence of sources to be audited.
In our simpli￿ed framework, where the sources are identical and not correlated, ex ante the tax
authority is indi⁄erent between audit paths. It has no relevance for the following results how
we specify the sequence of audits.
In what follows we derive the payo⁄a taxpayer that evades all his income sources can expect.
Since the sequence of income sources to be audited is not uniquely determined - every sequence
and every randomisation over di⁄erent sequences is possible, we present the expected payo⁄of a
ghost in terms of beliefs over possible audit paths. We once more denote the number of earned
income sources as n. Then the expected payo⁄ for the ghost will be:








The ￿rst term is the income net of concealment costs. The sum corresponds to the expected ￿ne,
where E [pk(e￿;a￿
k)] is the expected veri￿cation probability for the concealed income source k.
We can simplify this expression if we express the expected veri￿cation probabilities E [pk(e￿;a￿
k)]






￿ F ￿ E [￿ p(n)]
￿
(19)
15This assumption works in favour of ghost behaviour. If the tax inspector does not close the case the condition
for pro￿table ghost behaviour becomes more restrictive. However, the assumption that tax inspector closes the
case immedeatly is aquivalent to the assumption that there are waiting costs.
12It will prove useful to establish a result about the behaviour of E[￿ p] when the number of earned
income sources varies. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The expected average veri￿cation probability for earned income sources E[￿ p] increases
weakly with n, the number of productive income sources.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind the result that the average expected detection probability increases
with the number of productive income sources is quite simple: If a taxpayer earned more income
sources and concealed them all, an authority that audits sequentially is more likely to ￿nd out
earlier that it is facing a crook. Then the tax inspector will earlier step up the detection e⁄ort.
So the average detection e⁄ort and the average expected detection probability increase.
With this lemma in hand we are able to characterize the condition that has to hold for a ghost
equilibrium in the case that the authority audits sequentially. Analogous to the simultaneous
auditing case we get the following condition.
Proposition 2 A ghost equilibrium under sequential auditing exists only if ghost behaviour is
optimal for the taxpayer when all income sources are earned. The condition is given by
T ￿ e￿=￿
F








￿ is the optimal e⁄ort for the authority when it believes to face a crook with certainty.
Proof. The proof is basically along the same line as in the case of simultaneous auditing.
Our assumption that an authority audits simultaneously whenever the ex ante expected pay-o⁄s
are equal to those from sequential auditing ensures that we have the same deviation pay-o⁄s. The
inequality characterizing the best deviation is given by (16) once again. Thus we have to compare
U1 with EU(d0;n) from (19): EU(d0;n) ￿ U1 if (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F ￿ n(E[￿ p(n)]￿p(e￿;0))+p(e￿;0):
Note that E[￿ p(n)] ￿ p(e￿;0), since p(e￿;0) is a lower bound for p if the taxpayer exerts the
optimal e⁄ort. Knowing this and that ￿E[￿ p]=￿n ￿ 0 (from the previous lemma) we can
conclude that the rhs weakly increases with n while the lhs is constant. So the critical value for
n is again n = N. If n = N then the average audit probability does not depend on the audit
path any more, because all possible audit paths become equivalent. The authority will start
with the prior belief ￿0 and will update to ￿1 = ￿ after the ￿rst audit. Replacing nE[￿ p(n)] by
(N ￿ 1)p(e￿;a￿
￿) + p(e￿;a￿
0) gives the claimed condition.
In principle the interpretation of the condition to be satis￿ed for ghost behaviour is the same
as in the simultaneous auditing scenario. The main distinction is that the relevant measure for
audit e⁄ectiveness is now the di⁄erence in detection risk between a rubber-stamping authority
and an authority that invests in detection while knowing that it faces a crook.16 This increased
audit e⁄ectiveness re￿ ects the additional information the authority can obtain by conducting
its audits sequentially. Given the increased audit e⁄ectiveness under sequential auditing it is
straightforward to show that the possibility to audit sequentially leads to a stricter condition
that has to be satis￿ed in order to allow for ghost behaviour. So sequential auditing is an
appropriate tool to reduce ghost behaviour. Some taxpayers who would choose to behave as
ghosts under simultaneous auditing do not prefer to do so when auditing is sequential.
Proposition 3 Sequential auditing reduces ghost behaviour by imposing a stronger condition on
parameters in order to allow for a ghost equilibrium.
16Under simultaneous auditing the relevant measure for audit e⁄ectiveness was the di⁄erence between the
veri￿cation probabilities for rubber-stamping and auditing with the prior belief.
13Proof. The condition for sequential auditing is stronger whenever
(N ￿ 1)(p(e￿;a￿
￿) ￿ p(e￿;0)) + p(e￿;a￿
0) > N [p(e￿;a￿
0) ￿ p(e￿;0)] + p(e￿;0): Simplifying leads to
p(e￿;a￿
￿) > p(e￿;a￿
0) for N > 0, which implies ￿ > ￿￿0: This is obviously true for 0 < ￿ < 1.
The intuition behind the result is the following. By sequentially auditing the authority can
learn from previous audits. Detecting an incorrectly declared income source tells the authority
that it faces a crook. The case where an audit leads to the result that the actual income from a
certain source cannot be veri￿ed makes the tax inspector suspicious. In both cases the authority
will step up the audit e⁄ort for the remaining sources. The prospect of being heavily audited
deters some taxpayers from behaving as ghosts.
6.3 The sequential auditing path
Implicitly, we assumed that the authority is willing to audit sequentially whenever condition
(20) is satis￿ed. But this strategy is only credible if the ex ante expected payo⁄ from sequential
auditing exceeds the payo⁄ from auditing all income sources at once. Suppose for instance
that the tax authority chooses the rules of the game (sequential or simultaneous audits) after
observing the tax form. Then we will discuss the case where the authority can newly decide
after every audit how many of the remaining sources to audit in the next step.
6.3.1 Sequential versus simultaneous auditing
Suppose the authority has to decide after observing the income declaration whether to audit
all sources at once or to audit just one income source at a time. The tax inspector will choose
the latter strategy if his expected payo⁄ from doing so is bigger than it is for simultaneous
auditing. If the parameter setting allows for a ghost equilibrium for both auditing strategies
- i.e. inequality (20) holds - then the interesting situation is a tax inspector observing an all-
zero declaration.17 Then it is possible to show that sequential auditing pays. This result is
established in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the taxpayer can behave as ghost under both audit rules then sequential au-
diting pays for the tax authority.
Proof. The proof is in two steps. First we derive two su¢ cient conditions for our statement
to be true, then we show that these conditions are necessarily satis￿ed. The proposition requires
that the sum of the ex ante expected auditing pay-o⁄s from sequential auditing is greater than
the sum of the identical expected pay-o⁄s from simultaneous auditing:
N￿1 X
i=0
E [￿i ￿ p(e￿;a￿(￿i)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿i)] > N [￿0 ￿ p(e￿;a￿(￿0)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿0)]: (21)
The subscripts for the beliefs ￿ denote the number of audits that already have taken place (￿0
is the prior belief). Note that E is the expectation operator. The inequality is certainly ful￿lled
if
E [￿i ￿ p(e￿;a￿(￿i)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿i)] > ￿0 ￿ p(e￿;a￿(￿0)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿0) 8i 2 f1;:::;N ￿ 1g:
For i = 0 the expected pay-o⁄s are identical, because the beliefs for the ￿rst audit are the same
under both regimes. We know that under sequential auditing there are only two possible values
for the beliefs at every stage. These are ￿i;0 if no earned income source was audited before and
17For a declaration with at least one positive declaration the authority is indi⁄erent between both strategies;
the expected equilibrium payo⁄ is just the tax for the declared income components.
14￿i;1 = ￿ otherwise. Denoting the ex ante belief that after i audits no earned income source will
have been audited by ￿i and eliminating the expectation operator leads to the condition
￿i
￿
￿i;0 ￿ p(e￿;a(￿i;0)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿i;0)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿ ￿ p(e￿;a(￿)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿))
> ￿0 ￿ p(e￿;a￿(￿0)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(￿0) 8i 2 f1;:::;N ￿ 1g:
The tree parts of the equation just depend on the beliefs. We can write:
￿i ￿ R(￿i;0) + (1 ￿ ￿i)R(￿) > R(￿0) 8i 2 f1;:::;N ￿ 1g;
with R(x) = x ￿ p(e￿;a(x)) ￿ F ￿ a￿(x)
This condition surely holds (applying Jensen￿ s inequality) if R is convex in ￿ and E[￿i] = ￿0.
This is,
d2
d￿2R(￿) > 0 (C1)
￿i ￿ ￿i;0 + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ = ￿0 8i 2 f1;:::;N ￿ 1g (C2)
We examine (C1) ￿rst.
d2
d￿2R(￿) = F ￿ p0 [a(￿)] ￿
￿
2a0(￿) + ￿ ￿ a00(￿)
￿
+ (22)
+ F ￿ ￿ ￿ a0(￿)2 ￿ p00 [a(￿)] ￿ a00(￿)









￿ ￿ p00 (a(￿))
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Since p00 (a(￿)) < 0 by assumption, condition (C1) is satis￿ed.
Condition (C2) obviously has to hold. The ex ante expected belief after updating has to
be equal to the prior. This is commonly true if the updating is done without errors. Since we
assumed that the authority does not make any mistakes during the updating process (C2) is
satis￿ed. The proof for our purpose can be found in the appendix.
We brie￿ y summarize what we have established so far in this section. If the authority can
decide the rules of the game after observing the income declaration from a possible ghost (i.e. the
ghost condition from proposition 2 holds and a declaration containing only zeros is observed) it
will decide to audit sequentially. Sequential auditing is an equilibrium, because the payo⁄under
this regime is higher than under simultaneous auditing. Furthermore, the possibility of auditing
sequentially may deter some taxpayers from playing ghost, since the condition the parameters
have to satisfy for ghost behaviour to be pro￿table is stronger.
6.3.2 Free auditing choice
In what follows we lift the restriction that the authority has to decide once and for all whether to
audit sequentially or simultaneously. So suppose the tax inspector can decide after every audit
how many sources he wants to audit next. If we keep the assumption that the authority will
choose to audit sources together if this gives the same expected payo⁄ as sequential auditing
does, we get an auditing pattern in equilibrium that is widely observed in reality. Facing a
potential ghost the tax inspector will audit source by source until he is sure that he is facing a
crook. Then he will conduct a simultaneous full scale audit of the remaining sources. That such
a procedure is indeed optimal for the tax authority is stated in the following proposition.
15Proposition 5 It is optimal for the authority facing a potential ghost to audit source by source
as long as the belief that the remaining sources are productive and concealed is smaller than ￿.
If ￿ reaches ￿ it is optimal to audit all remaining sources simultaneously.
Proof. See appendix.
The audit path that is described as optimal by the above proposition creates audit patterns
that are widely observed in reality. The tax inspector picks a certain income source for audit. If
he cannot ￿nd any concealed income during this audit he may switch to another potential income
source to conduct checks with a reduced e⁄ort. But as soon as the inspector gets suspicious or
even can prove evasion, all possible income sources are immediately checked with high e⁄ort.
The assumption that the tax inspector audits simultaneously if he is indi⁄erent between the
two audit strategies is crucial for our result that in the case of suspicion simultaneous full-scale
audits are conducted. However, there is no reason why the authority should conduct sequential
full-scale audits. On the one hand there is nothing to learn about the taxpayer any more,
since the tax inspector is certain to face a crook. And on the other hand sequential auditing
could cause some additional costs that are not included in our framework. On might think of
the possibility that the taxpayer may try to destroy evidence when he realizes that he will be
subject to a full-scale audit.
7 Evasion of fractions of total income
In this section we explore what the taxpayers do if the environment is not favourable enough
for ghost behaviour. Intuition suggests that in such a situation crooks may hide only some of
their income components. This, however, does not increase the gain from evasion if the tax
authority can anticipate, which income components are evaded. Consequently, a crook creates
some additional uncertainty for the authority by randomly choosing the income components
he evades. Such a behaviour decreases the authority￿ s perceived probability that a particular
income component is evaded. The lower probability causes a lower expected payo⁄from auditing
and reduces the detection e⁄ort.
In the following two sections we characterize the equilibria that arise under the di⁄erent
audit rules if pure ghost behaviour does not pay. For simplicity we will only consider the case
with two potential income sources. In order to compare the e⁄ectiveness of the two di⁄erent
audit rules we derive conditions on the parameters that allow for pro￿table evasion. It turns out
that once again sequential auditing has the edge over simultaneous auditing. The environment
necessary for pro￿table evasion has to be more favourable for the taxpayer under the sequential
audit regime.
7.1 Simultaneous auditing
Recall the condition that ghost behaviour does pay under sequential auditing, which is given by






Consider the following strategy of a taxpayer:
1. If both income components are earned he mixes between concealing both sources, conceal-
ing only the ￿rst source, and concealing only the second source.
2. If only one income component is earned he conceals it with certainty.
3. If no income is earned he truthfully declares zero for both sources.
16Denote the mixing probabilities for the case that both sources are earned by ￿(0;0) for
evading both sources, by ￿(0;y) for evading only the ￿rst source, and by ￿(y;0) for evading only
the second source.
This is the only strategy with randomisation that guarantees pro￿ts from evasion. A mixed
strategy that includes reporting truthfully, if some income is earned, necessarily leads to the
same expected pro￿t as being honest with certainty. Otherwise if evasion gives a higher payo⁄
than being honest, then there is no reason why the taxpayer should choose to declare truthfully
with a positive probability.
A tax man anticipating the taxpayer￿ s mixing will have the following beliefs where the
arguments for ￿ represent the observed declaration behaviour:
￿(0;0) =
￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;0) + 2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2
￿(0;y) =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;y)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;y))
￿(y;0) =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(y;0)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(y;0))
:
If the declaration for both sources is zero then ￿(0;0) is the belief that one particular income
sources is evaded. This belief is identical for both income sources. If one income source is
declared the belief that a zero declaration for the other source comes from tax fraud is given by
￿(0;y) and ￿(y;0) where the source with a zero declaration is the one in question.
Denote the expected payo⁄ from a pure strategy as Uij(di;dj), where the subscripts denote
the actual incomes from source i and j. The declaration behaviour is given by the arguments.
To be willing to mix between evading both sources or just cheating for one source the taxpayer
has to be indi⁄erent between the expected pay-o⁄s these pure strategies yield. Additionally,
the payo⁄ from these evasion strategies should not be smaller than the payo⁄ from reporting
truthfully. In equilibrium the following has to hold:
Uyy(0;0) = Uyy(y;0) = Uyy(0;y) ￿ Uyy(y;y) (23)
If only one source is earned in equilibrium the taxpayer prefers to evade it with certainty if:
Uy0(0;0) ￿ Uy0(y;0) and U0y(0;0) ￿ U0y(y;0): (24)
Combining (23) and (24) leads to the necessary condition that a crook uses the described mixed
strategy in equilibrium. The condition is given in the following proposition. Here p(￿(0;0))
denotes the detection probability arising from the lowest possible belief that a source is evaded
if an all-zero declaration is observed, while p(￿(y;0)) is the probability caused by the highest
possible belief that one source is evaded if the other is declared.
Proposition 6 For p(￿(0;0)) ￿ p(￿(y;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F < 2p(e￿;a￿
0) ￿ p(e￿;0) under simul-
taneous auditing there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the taxpayers￿expected payo⁄ is
higher than that from reporting truthfully.
Proof. See the appendix.
The condition above needs some explaining. The detection probabilities for evaded sources
given a certain declaration pattern depend on the mixing probabilities. A crook chooses the
mixing probabilities in order that the conditions (23) and (24) are satis￿ed. Whether this is
possible depends on the parameters. For an equilibrium in mixed strategies where the tax-
payer gets a pro￿t from evasion the parameters have to be favourable enough that evasion pays
p(￿(0;0)) ￿ p(￿(y;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F). But the environment should not be too favourable,
because then - for (T ￿e￿=￿)=F > 2p(e￿;a￿
0)￿p(e￿;0) - to behave as a ghost with certainty be-
comes pro￿table. The environment is favourable for evasion if the taxes liabilities T are high, if
17concealment is cheap (high ￿), and if the ￿nes F are low. Additionally, a low earnings probability
￿ and a low proportion of crooks in the population ￿ is bene￿cial for evasion.
The question arises what a taxpayer will do if neither ghost behaviour nor mixing lead to
positive pro￿ts from evasion. In this case (i.e. max[p(￿(y;0));p(￿(0;0))] > (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F) it
is possible to include the strategy to report truthfully in the mixing as well. This will further
drive down the detection e⁄ort of the authority by reducing the beliefs that income is evaded.
But, this will leave the taxpayer with no expected gain from tax evasion. To see this recall the
indi⁄erence condition (23) for two earned income sources. Then Uyy(0;0) = Uyy(y;0) = Uyy(0;y)
implies




The indi⁄erence condition for the case where one source is earned is given by Uy0(0;0) =




By combining equations the condition becomes
p(￿(0;0)) ￿ F = p(￿(y;0)) ￿ F = T ￿ e￿=￿:
This implies that the expected payo⁄for the taxpayer is equivalent to the honesty payo⁄regard-
less how many income components are earned. The expected ￿ne is always equal to the taxes
saved net of concealment costs.18 So we may obtain a hybrid equilibrium where a taxpayer
who earned at least one source evades with positive probability although he does not expect
any pro￿t from evading. Why is reporting truthfully not an equilibrium? Reporting truthfully
with certainty would lead to an authority rubber-stamping the tax declaration. But under the
belief that the authority will rubber-stamp the declaration, the taxpayer prefers to evade. The
less bene￿cial the environment is for evasion the lower the probability becomes that evasion
takes place. Note that our assumption that the authority cannot commit to an audit strategy
is crucial for this result.19
7.2 Mixing with sequential auditing
We now turn to the sequential auditing regime. We once again derive the conditions that have
to be met for pro￿table tax evasion to take place. This is the case if mixing leads to a higher
expected net payo⁄ than being honest. The derivation of the conditions for this mixed strategy
equilibrium is analogous to the case with simultaneous auditing. We just have to remember
that we may have di⁄erent beliefs for a tax authority observing an all-zero declaration before
and after auditing the ￿rst source. The belief before auditing the ￿rst source of an all-zero
declaration - denoted by ￿0(0;0) - will be the same as in the simultaneous case. The belief after
the ￿rst audit will depend on the outcome of the ￿rst audit. Denote this belief as ￿1;y(0;0) if
there was evasion and as ￿1;0(0;0) if there was no evasion. The ￿rst subsript gives the number
of audits conducted, while the second gives the outcome of the audit if there was one. In the
￿rst case the perceived probability that the second source is earned and evaded increases, since
it is now known that the taxpayer is a crook, while in the second case this probability decreases,
because it is becoming more likely that the taxpayer might be an honest citizen. The beliefs
in the case that one income source is declared are the same as in the simultaneous auditing
18To satisfy the indi⁄erence condition it may be necessary that the taxpayer is totally honest with positive
probability if both income sources are earned.
19Most authors seem to regard this as an unrealistic feature of moral hazard models without commitment, but
introspection (my fare-evasion behaviour on commuter trains) suggests that mixing actually seems to happen.
18scenario. Since it will turn out that ￿(0;y) = ￿(y;0) has to be true, we only give one of these
beliefs. The relevant beliefs are given by:
￿0(0;0) =
￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;0) + 2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2
￿1;y(0;0) =
￿ ￿ ￿(0;0)
￿ ￿ ￿(0;0) + 1 ￿ ￿
￿1;0(0;0) =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
￿(0;y) =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;y)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(0;y))
:




￿) ￿ p(e￿;0) + p(e￿;a￿
0): (26)
Using the same logic as in the simultaneous auditing scenario we can derive an analogous condi-
tion. Lower and upper bars once again denote lower and upper bounds for the beliefs depending













=2 ￿ p(￿(y;0)) <
< (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F < p(e￿;a￿
￿) ￿ p(e￿;0) + p(e￿;a￿
0) (27)
under sequential auditing there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the taxpayer￿ s expected
payo⁄ is higher than that from reporting truthfully.
Proof. See appendix.
Note that for parameter con￿gurations where neither ghost behaviour nor randomising over
the evasion of di⁄erent sources is pro￿table a crook will be honest with positive probability
and have an expected payo⁄ equal to the honesty payo⁄. The argument is the same as in the
simultaneous case.
Comparing the conditions under the di⁄erent auditing regimes shows that the requirements





￿ p(￿(y;0))).20 This means that for some parameter settings where a crook
still makes pro￿ts from evasion under simultaneous audit he will not make any evasion pro￿ts if
the authority audits sequentially. Sequential auditing therefore has the edge over simultaneous
auditing once again.
8 Self-selection of moonlighters
In this section we argue that our model can explain a commonly observed pattern of self-
selection into di⁄erent income sources. The pattern in question is moonlighting. We think of
people that are working in regular employment during the day while being active in the black
market economy during evenings and weekends. Craftsmen are a prominent example. Why do
these people not entirely engage in the black economy, or as an alternative just work long hours
in the o¢ cial sector? Standard explanations argue that small markets in the moonlighting sector
drive the wages for workers or prices for ￿rms down if the activity is increased. It is argued















19that for this reason entirely going underground does not pay. See Cowell and Gordon (1995) for
the self-selection of ￿rms, Cowell and Gordon (1990) for workers, or Gordon (1988) for a model
of black market transactions. We argue that there might be an additional incentive for people
splitting their activity between the black market and the o¢ cial sector: a tax authority that is
auditing sequentially creates these incentives. If a taxpayer relies too heavily on black market
activity then a sequentially auditing tax authority learns too easily that the taxpayer is a crook,
which will lead to a full-scale audit. So it might be a pro￿table strategy to work in the o¢ cial
sector during daytime - although evasion is not pro￿table there - just to engage in black-market
activity in the evenings where high evasion pro￿ts with a low detection risk are possible.
Suppose that the taxpayer has the possibility of receiving income from two income sources.
There are two di⁄erent markets, the black market and the o¢ cial sector. The taxpayer can
choose how many (of his two) sources to allocate to the di⁄erent sectors. The black market
sector has the advantage that there tax evasion is pro￿table. Suppose that his pro￿t from
moonlighting is greater than from honestly working in the o¢ cial sector even if the taxpayer
allocates both sources to the underground economy.21 In the o¢ cial sector tax evasion never
pays, since the activity is too easy to observe by the authority (i.e. the observability parameters
￿; ! are prohibitive). The advantage in the o¢ cial sector is that the gross income from the
sources is higher. This re￿ ects the discount a customer demands for the contract enforcement
problems if a moonlighter is employed. Unlike other models we do not have to assume that the
gross income in the moonlighting sector decreases with the activity. This assumption made in
other models seems to be reasonable in the aggregate, but surely not on the individual level. A
painter ￿privately￿decorating two ￿ ats on a weekend does not earn less money per ￿ at than a
painter who just decorates one.
We will show that there are parameter con￿gurations that make it optimal for the taxpayer
to divide his e⁄orts between the two sectors even in the case where ghost behaviour pays for
someone who decided to devote his entire e⁄ort to the underground economy. In order to induce
such a self-selection choice the ex ante expected payo⁄ from dividing the e⁄orts (EUm) has to
be higher than that from being a ghost in the black economy (EUb) and has also to be higher
than the payo⁄ from working entirely in the o¢ cial sector (EUo). The pay-o⁄s are given by
EUo = 2￿(Y0 ￿ T);
EUm = ￿(Yo ￿ T) + ￿(Yb ￿ p(e￿;a￿
0) ￿ F ￿ e￿=￿);
and
EUb = ￿2(2Yb ￿ (p(e￿;a￿
0) + p(e￿;a￿
￿)) ￿ F ￿ 2e￿=￿)
+ 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(Yb ￿ (p(e￿;a￿
0) + p(e￿;a￿
1)) ￿ F=2 ￿ e￿=￿);
where Yo and Yb are the gross incomes in the o¢ cial sector and in the black market, respectively.
The payo⁄if the craftsman only works in the o¢ cial sector EUo is twice the net income multiplied
by the earnings probability. The expected income from dividing e⁄orts EUm is the sum of the
expected incomes in the two sectors. The payo⁄ for ghosts in the black market is given by
EUb. The ￿rst part represents the case that both income components are earned (weighted
with probability ￿2 that this happens). Under sequential auditing one source will be audited
with the e⁄ort a￿
0 corresponding to the prior while the other source is audited with e⁄ort a￿
￿.
The second part of EUb corresponds to the two possible cases that just one source is earned
(with probability ￿(1￿￿) each). Depending on whether the authority audits the earned source
as the ￿rst or second the source, the e⁄ort will be a￿
0 or a￿
1. Regardless of how the authority




21This setting is the least favourable for any activity in the o¢ cial sector; and therefore gives the strongest
result.
20The condition EUm > EUo - participating in both markets is better than just working in









For participating in both markets to be better than to concentrate entirely on the underground
EUm > EUb has to hold. This reduces to
￿ ￿ p(e￿;a￿








Obviously, both inequalities for themselves do not con￿ ict necessarily with the ghost condition
for sequential auditing (20). The possibility to satisfy them simultaneously requires
p(e￿;a￿
0) < ￿ ￿ p(e￿;a￿
￿) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p(e￿;a￿
1) (28)
It is possible that this condition is satis￿ed. We know that p(e￿;a￿
0) is larger than p(e￿;a￿
1) and
smaller than p(e￿;a￿
￿). Whether the inequality is satis￿ed depends on the shape of the detection
probability function and on the parameters ￿ and ￿. A high earnings probability ￿ and a small
proportion of crooks in the population ￿ makes it more likely that working in both worlds pays.
To put it di⁄erently, as long as there are enough honest craftsmen and the earning opportunities
are relatively secure, then a ruthless craftsman may choose to work in both the o¢ cial sector
and the black market.22
9 Conclusion
The tax declaration situation and the following examination of the tax form by the authorities
create a highly complex strategic environment. In this paper this is modelled as a contest
between taxpayer and authority where both invest in concealment and detection, respectively.
We stressed the fact that income comes from di⁄erent income sources. Since auditing one source
may reveal valuable information about the taxpayer and his likely tax declaration behaviour for
other sources, we allowed for sequential auditing. A comparison of the outcomes of the contest
under this sequential audit rule with the outcome that occurs if the tax authority audits all
sources at the same time was conducted. This helps to explain the rationale for a widely
observed audit pattern: Tax inspectors sequentially conduct routine checks with a consecutive
full-scale audit if suspicion of evasion arises from these checks. Furthermore we shed some light
on the reasons why people moonlight in the black market sector and at the same time follow a
normal job in the o¢ cial sector.
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A Some proofs of lemmata and propositions in the main text
A.1 Proof of lemma 3
Proof. For the N income sources there are N! possible audit paths. The taxpayer has beliefs
about the probabilities that the di⁄erent paths are followed by the tax inspector. These beliefs
have to be consistent with the equilibrium strategy of the tax authority. Let the belief that
a particular path is followed be ￿j with
P
￿j = 1. Then the expected average veri￿cation









where pk;j is the (equilibrium) veri￿cation probability for income source k given that the audit
path j is followed. Since the belief of the tax authority of facing a concealed income source if a
previous audit was successful is ￿, we know that for n ￿ 1 income components the veri￿cation
probability has to be p￿ = p(e￿;a￿
￿). The probability of the remaining source depends on the
audit path. More precisely, this probability depends on the belief ￿r the tax inspector will have
when he audits the ￿rst concealed income source. This belief will be
￿r =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)N￿r + ￿
;
where r gives the number of audits before the ￿rst concealed income component is found. Note
that r depends on the audit path and the number of earned income sources. Rewriting E[￿ p] and










(n ￿ 1)p￿ + pr(j;n)
￿
=n increases with n for all paths j, then E[￿ p] obviously also increases with
n.
An additional income source that is earned can be audited before or after the critical income
source r. If audited before the new r will be smaller. Otherwise r remains unchanged if n
increases. It follows
r(j;n) ￿ r(j;n + 1) 8j;n < N:
From the observations that ￿r decreases with r and that p(￿) weakly increases with ￿ due to a
higher optimal detection e⁄ort (lemma 1), it follows
pr(j;n+1) ￿ pr(j;n) 8j;n < N:











Since ￿ > ￿r and p(x) ￿ p(x0) if x > x0 it follows that for the valid n (0 < n < N) the rhs is




This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof for correct updating (used to prove propositions 4 and 5)

















It is su¢ cient to show that ￿E[￿i]=￿i = 0 for all i, since E(￿0) = ￿0. The change of the
expected beliefs for an increasing i is given by
￿E[￿i]
￿i
= E[￿i+1] ￿ E[￿i] =
























Using the values for ￿i;0 and ￿i+1;0 from (17) shows that the expression in the brackets is equal
to zero. This concludes the proof.
24A.3 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Let r be the number of sources already audited. Let j 2 f1;:::;N ￿1￿rg be the number
of sources next to be audited simultaneously. Then the expected continuation payo⁄ will be
CRr;j = j ￿ ER(￿r) + CRr+j,
where ER(￿r) is the expected payo⁄ from one of the income components that are audited
together while CRr+j gives the expected continuation payo⁄ for all the remaining sources. The
total continuation payo⁄ from auditing the next j sources sequentially is denoted by CRr;1and





We have to show that
CRr;1 > CRr;j if ￿r < ￿
CRr;1 ￿ CRr;j if ￿r = ￿
8r 2 f0;:::;N ￿ 2g, j > 1;
We can write the di⁄erence as









ER(￿i) ￿ (j ￿ 1)ER(￿r):
Note that the CRr+j depends on the audit history, but not on the audit strategy. So CRr+j is
the same for both audit strategies. We already see that for ￿r = ￿ the di⁄erence CRr;1 ￿CRr;j
is zero, since ￿r = ￿ implies ￿i = ￿ for all i ￿ r. On the other hand the di⁄erence is necessarily
positive if
ER(￿i) > ER(￿r) 8i 2 fr + 1;:::;r + jg:
We can eliminate the expectation operator by writing




R(￿) > R(￿r) 8i 2 fr + 1;:::;r + jg,
where ￿i=r￿1 this time denotes the belief that before the audit of source i no source that was
productive will have been audited, given the history of audits up to r ￿1. Note that for ￿r = ￿
the beliefs ￿i=r￿1 are 0. For ￿i=r￿1 > 0 the inequality above holds if:
d2
d￿2R(￿) > 0 (C1)




￿ = ￿r 8i 2 fr + 1;:::;r + jg: (C2￿ )
We have already proven convexity (C1), while condition C2￿again expresses updating without
errors. The observation that C2￿is equivalent to C2, which was proven above, concludes the
proof.
A.4 Proof of proposition 6
Proof. Uyy(y;0) = Uyy(0;y) implies that p(￿(0;y)) = p(￿(y;0)). Note that this has to be the
case, since the probability is a monotonous function of the authority￿ s e⁄ort and the optimal
e⁄ort is a monotonous function of the belief. A further implication is that ￿(0;y) = ￿(y;0)
(short ￿(y;0)). It follows immediately that ￿(0;y) = ￿(y;0).
25Uyy(0;0) = Uyy(y;0) = Uyy(0;y) implies




For ￿(0;0) ! 1 it follows p(￿(0;0)) ! p(e￿;a￿
0), since ￿(0;0) ! ￿0. Then necessarily ￿(0;y) ! 0
and ￿(y;0) ! 0; which implies p(￿(y;0)) ! p(e￿;0). Our condition converges against the ghost
condition with equality.
For ￿(0;0) ! 0 we know ￿(0;0) ! ￿￿￿=(2￿￿￿￿ +1￿￿) = ￿(0;0) < ￿0 and ￿(0;y) ! 1=2,
which implies that ￿(y;0) ! ￿ ￿ ￿=(2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ ￿) = ￿(y;0).
Note that ￿(0;0) increases with ￿(0;0); while ￿(y;0) decreases when ￿(0;0) increases. Since










with the ￿ndings from above we can write:




0) ￿ p(e￿;0): (30)
Checking Uyy(0;y) > Uyy(y;y) leads to p(￿(y;0)) < (T￿e￿=￿)=F.23 Taking the upper bound
p(￿(y;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F and combining it with (30) leads to
p(￿(0;0)) ￿ p(￿(y;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F < 2p(e￿;a￿
0) ￿ p(e￿;0)
as a su¢ cient condition to be satis￿ed. It remains to check that Uy0(0;0) > Uy0(y;0) holds. In-
spection shows that this reduces to the same condition as above Uyy(0;y) < Uyy(y;y) (i.e. p(￿(y;0)) <
(T ￿e￿=￿)=F). Since we checked for Uy0(0;0) > Uy0(y;0) and Uyy(0;0) = Uyy(0;y) > Uyy(y;y),
evasion pays in this equilibrium. This concludes the proof.
A.5 Proof of proposition 7
Proof. The proof is along the same lines as the proof for the simultaneous case. The indi⁄erence
and dominance conditions are the same as in the simultaneous case and are given by (23) and
(24). The condition Uyy(y;0) = Uyy(0;y) again implies that ￿(y;0) = ￿(0;y).
Uyy(0;0) = Uyy(y;0) = Uyy(0;y) implies




The lhs converges against p(e￿;a￿
￿)￿p(e￿;0)+p(e￿;a￿
0) for ￿(0;0) ! 1. Monotonicity of p in ￿,








is a necessary condition for (31) to be satis￿able. Since Uyy(0;y) > Uyy(y;y); we get
p(￿(y;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F:




=2 < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F (33)
23Note, that we look for the strict inequality here to exclude the equilibria where tax evasion leads to the same
expected payo⁄ as honesty.
26Using the relevant limits for the two inequalities above and combining them with (32)
and (26) leads to the su¢ cient condition stated in the proposition. It remains to check that
Uy0(0;0) > Uy0(y;0) and U0y(0;0) > U0y(0;y) does not lead to a stricter condition. If we denote
the probability that the authority audits source one ￿rst with   then the two conditions imply24
  ￿ p(￿0(0;0)) + (1 ￿  ) ￿ p(￿1;0(0;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F and
(1 ￿  ) ￿ p(￿0(0;0)) +   ￿ p(￿1;0(0;0)) < (T ￿ e￿=￿)=F.
Certainly (33) is stricter, since p(￿1;y(0;0)) > p(￿1;0(0;0)). This concludes the proof.
24Note that we can choose   arbitrarily since the authority is indi⁄erent about which source to audit ￿rst.
27B Supplement: Numerical example
B.1 Pure strategy equilibrium
In this section we present a numerical example to give a better ￿ avour of how the abstract model
actually works. Suppose that the probability of being caught for evasion is given by:
p(e;a) = :3 +
ln(:2 + a) ￿ ln(:2 + e)
4
:
This function is designed to guarantee p to be between zero and one for relevant values of a and
e.25 Let the potential income per source be y = 10. The sources are productive with probability
￿ = :3. Let the linear tax rate be :5 (i.e. a liability per source of T = 5). The ￿ne is F = 7.
The e⁄ectiveness of the covering technology is ￿xed at ￿ = :33. Assume that the proportion of
crooks in the population is known to be ￿ = :3. We ￿x the number of potential income sources at
N = 3. Table 1 shows the expected pay-o⁄s for ghosts and the deviation payo⁄, which is earned
from pretending to be a good citizen by declaring at least one income source. The sequential
ghost payo⁄ is calculated under the assumption that the tax authority randomises with equal
weights among the di⁄erent audit paths. We see that for three earned income sources behaving
as a ghost still pays under simultaneous auditing while sequential auditing prevents the taxpayer
from ghost behaviour.
Earned sources n=1 n=2 n=3
Simultaneous, ghost Usim(d0) 7:96 15:93 23:89
Sequential, ghost Useq(d0) 8:17 15:00 21:83
Deviation Usi=se(d1) 5:00 13:62 22:25
Table 1: Expected ghost and deviation payo⁄
And in fact, if we calculate the critical ^ N from condition (20) for sequential auditing and
from condition (15) for simultaneous auditing we see that ^ Nseq = Int(2:79) and ^ Nsim = Int(3:99).
We know from our analytical analysis that for both auditing strategies a higher tax liability T
facilitates ghost behaviour. Fixing the number of sources at N = 3 we can compute the critical
T for ghost behaviour for both cases. We ￿nd that the minimal tax liabilities leading to ghost
behaviour are ^ Tsim = 3:36 for simultaneous auditing and ^ Tseq = 5:41 for sequential auditing. To
compare the revenue from di⁄erent auditing regimes for the case that ghost behaviour always
pays we let T = 5:5.
Earned sources n=0 n=1 n=2 n=3 E￿n
Simultaneous Rsim(d0) ￿:27 :61 1:50 2:39 :17
Sequential Rseq(d0) ￿:14 :12 2:04 3:98 :22
Table 2: Revenue from auditing
Table 2 reports in the ￿rst four columns the revenues for given numbers of productive income
sources (if a declaration of only zeros is observed). The last column weights these revenues with
their likelihood and sums them up. This gives the relevant expected revenue from auditing with
the respective strategies if an all-zero declaration is observed. Examining the overall revenue
(including tax payments of honest taxpayers, ￿nes, and detection costs) simultaneous auditing
results in an expected collection of 71.8% of expected tax liabilities. The sequential auditing
does slightly better with 72.4%. We see that sequential auditing pays.
25This detection probability function gives values for the observability parameters ￿ = 5=4 and ! = ￿5=4.
28B.2 Hybrid equilibrium
Return to the numerical example from above with all the parameters - except the tax liability - at
their original values. We reduce the tax rate to :2 (i.e. the tax liability is T = 2). This ensures
that for both audit strategies pure ghost behaviour does not pay for the case of two income
sources. We ￿x N = 2. Applying condition 25 leads to the mixing probabilities: ￿yy(0;0) = :16
and ￿yy(y;0) = ￿yy(0;y) = :42 under simultaneous auditing. The expected payo⁄ after earning
both sources will be EUyy = 17:43. Earning one source will lead to EUy0 = 8:72. The expected
net revenue from auditing for the authority will be ER = :93. Over all the collection e¢ ciency
is 77% of the expected gross tax liability.
Sequential auditing is able to prevent the taxpayer from playing a mixed strategy equilibrium
where a positive evasion gain is made, because the condition from proposition 7 is violated. He
will play a mixed strategy equilibrium where he earns nothing from concealment. Consequently
the pay-o⁄s are EUyy = 16 and EUy0 = 8. Although not having calculated the equilibrium
probabilities and expected revenue, we know that the collection e¢ ciency will be higher than
under simultaneous auditing, since the new equilibrium includes honesty as a strategy. This will
drive down both the audit e⁄ort and the ex ante expected concealment e⁄ort. This, combined
with the observation that the payo⁄ of the taxpayer is smaller, leads to the conclusion that the
tax collection e¢ ciency is higher under sequential auditing.
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